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Fairness perceptions and organizational 
misbehavior: an empirical study 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Employees evaluate the fairness or justice of their workplace: does one get what one 
deserves at work? Organizational scholars consider perceived workplace fairness to be a 
relevant factor in predicting and explaining organizational misbehavior. For instance, 
Treviño and Weaver found in their study that the more employees perceive that their 
organization is just, the less they perceive their colleagues to be engaged in behavior that 
harms the organization. This hypothesis was retested with an alternative measure of 
organizational misbehavior in 19 Flemish governmental organizations, and confirmation 
was found. Moreover, the effect holds when controlling for integrity policy, leadership, 
tenure and gender. 
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Introduction 
Research interest in business ethics (e.g. Roberston, 2007) as well as in administrative ethics (e.g. Cooper, 
2001) has been growing in recent years. Numerous studies have attempted to explain organizational ethics by 
focusing on antecedents such as ethical climate (e.g. Martin & Cullen, 2006; Maesschalck, 2004; Vardi, 2001; 
Victor & Cullen, 1988, 1987), ethical culture (e.g. Treviño, 1990), ethical leadership (e.g. Lasthuizen, 2008; 
Brown & Treviño, 2006; Treviño et al., 2000), ethics policies (e.g. Menzel, 2007; Singh, 2006) and codes of 
ethics (e.g. Grundstein, 2001; Somers, 2001), to name just a few. However, as Treviño and Weaver (2001) 
argue, a factor that is strikingly absent in the explanation of organizational misbehavior, is perceived fairness 
(e.g. Martinson et al., 2006. Treviño & Weaver, 2001). In an attempt to strengthen and extend our knowledge 
of this link, this article reexamines the relationship between perceived organizational justice or fairness on the 
one hand and organizational misbehavior on the other. It will do so in another context than the Treviño and 
Weaver study, thus contributing to our knowledge on the generalizability of the fairness-misbehavior relation. 
 
Before specifying the specific cultural setting, we first provide a brief overview of the literature and present the 
central hypothesis. We then present the research methods and the results of the empirical study. The article 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the study. 
 
Fairness and its link with organizational misbehavior 
Throughout this paper the term organizational justice or fairness will be used to refer to “a fundamental social 
expectation that motivates behavior” (Treviño & Weaver, 2001:652). Scholars consider perceived fairness to 
be significant for organizational theory and practice for multiple reasons (Colquitt et al., 2005). Tyler and Lind 
(1992), for example, notice that perceived organizational justice can increase the legitimacy and trustworthiness 
of organizational authorities. Those are factors which are supposed to reduce fear of exploitation (Lind, 2001), 
provide an incentive to cooperate with one’s co-workers (Lind, 2001) and discourage various forms of disruptive 
behavior (Greenberg & Lind, 2000).  
 
Several authors have attempted to develop a theoretical account of the relationship between fairness on the 
one hand and disruptive organizational behavior on the other. Two of the most prevalent theoretical frameworks 
are fairness heuristic theory (Van den Bos et al., 1997) and equity theory (Adams, 1965). We briefly address 
each of them in turn.  
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The concept of cognitive heuristics is drawn from psychology. It indicates that when we are confronted with 
much information and/or have to make a decision, we resort to mental shortcuts or heuristics to process the 
large amount of information. A judgment heuristic can be defined as “a mental assumption or quick rule of 
thumb that people use to judge quickly and efficiently” (Aronson et al., 2007:79 - our translation). In elaborating 
fairness heuristics theory, Van den Bos et al. (1997) argue that employees use their general impressions of the 
fairness of their organization as a main guideline or heuristic when they evaluate their relationship with their 
organization, or, as proposed in a subsequent study by Van den Bos et al. (1998), when they estimate the 
trustworthiness of the organization. This evaluation, in turn, is considered to guide employees’ behavior. In 
applying this theory, Treviño and Weaver suggest that the employees who perceive their organization as fair 
“will sense no need to balance the scales of justice by looking for opportunities to improve their own outcomes 
at the organization’s expense” (2001:652).  So when employees think about their workplace as fair, it is less 
likely they will try to compensate by engaging in behavior which is possibly harmful to the organization.  
 
Equity theory on the other hand, claims that employees balance their contributions to the organization (effort 
put in their work, skill, training, experience, intelligence, etc.) to what they get out of this contribution (pay, 
intrinsic rewards, job status, seniority benefits, etc.) forming an input/outcome ratio (Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; 
Adams, 1965). Employees compare this ratio to the ratio of a significant referent group or person or to their own 
ratio at an earlier time. If their own ratio does not equal the referent’s, inequity is experienced. An inequity that 
is the result of one’s own ratio falling below the referent’s, results in feelings of anger. In case one’s own ratio 
surmounts the ratio of the referent, an inequity is experienced which results in feelings of guilt (Greenberg & 
Colquitt, 2005; Adams, 1965). Equity theory predicts some behavioral effects originating from these feelings. 
Employees experiencing inequity will try to restore the input/outcome balance, either by action (for example 
through adjusting the quality or quantity of their work) or by cognitive adaptations (for example by choosing 
other referents). As the behavioral restorative actions can be to the disadvantage of the organization and/or 
amount to misbehavior, equity theory could be used to hypothesize an association between employee 
misbehavior and perceived organizational justice (or equity): the former can be the result of acting on the latter. 
 
Drawing on this, Treviño and Weaver hypothesized that “the more employees perceive that their organization 
is just, the less employees will engage in unethical conduct that harms the organization” (2001:653). They used 
data from a survey on compliance management in four private sector organizations to test this hypothesis1. 
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The hypothesis was confirmed by the data: the observed unethical conduct was higher where employees 
perceived less general fairness (t= -13.58, p < 0.01) (2001:662).  
 
Fairness and its link with organizational behavior: the Flemish public sector 
As was already indicated above, the current study aims to test the relationship between fairness perceptions 
and organizational misbehavior in another context than Treviño and Weaver (2001), since the universality of 
this relationship does not speak for itself. Therefore, the study will be carried out in a West-European public 
sector setting, specifically in Flanders, the Dutch speaking region in the North of Belgium. 
 
At first sight, we could consider the public and private sector to be different. We might, for instance, consider 
the public sector to differ with regard to its values and norms (e.g. neutrality, objectivity, legality), the nature of 
its tasks (e.g. those related to the state monopoly on coercive power), or its social structure and human resource 
management (e.g. employee contracts with specific legal protections) (e.g. Raadschelders, 2003). Following 
this reasoning, one could also suppose particular types and effects of perceived fairness in the public sector. 
Nonetheless, it seems that until now research has not provided conclusive evidence with regard to the proposed 
difference between the public and the private sector in general (e.g. Kurland & Egan, 1999). So, it is not clear 
whether it would be reasonable to expect different fairness effects in public and private sector organizations. 
More empirical evidence is needed and the current article aims to contribute to this by testing the influence of 
fairness perceptions on organizational misbehavior in a public sector context.  
 
Hofstede (1980)’s research suggests that there are specific cultural differences between nations - culture being 
defined along the dimensions of power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. As 
culture is argued to be related to perceived fairness and employee misbehavior (e.g. Brockner et al., 2000), one 
might hypothesize that the link between fairness perceptions and organizational misbehavior differs depending 
on the cultural context. Evidence that the hypothesized relationship holds in different cultural conditions will thus 
add to the strength of it.  
 
Taking into account the particular Flemish public sector setting, the following hypothesis is formulated: The 
more employees in the surveyed Flemish government organizations perceive their organization to be just, the 
less they engage in organizational misbehavior.  
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It is important to note that the dependent variable in this hypothesis (organizational misbehavior) will not be 
measured by a self-report measure. In an attempt to reduce social desirability bias, observed behavior of 
colleagues is used as a proxy-measure for personal behavior. This choice implies a number of limitations that 
are acknowledged and will be addressed in the last sections of this article. 
  
Methods 
 
Data collection 
The data used in this contribution were collected in 2007 – 2008, by means of a web survey in the Flemish 
government. A two step sample procedure was applied. First, all entities (about 70) of the regional government, 
informed and invited by a coordinating body and an ethics committee, were free to participate in this study. 
Nineteen entities decided to participate. Second, all public servants (i.e. the total population) within these 
entities (N=7060) were sent an e-mail request with a personalized URL-link for the questionnaire. 7017 of 
these online surveys reached the respondents. Follow-up was done by sending reminders, news flashes and 
a regularly updated top five of the entities with the highest response rate. In total 3386 (48.3%) public servants 
returned the questionnaire. 
 
The aim of the research project “Integrity at the workplace” was two-fold (Delbeke et al., 2008). First, the 
researchers were to design a survey tool, suited for self application by government administrations. Second, 
a measurement instrument would provide the participating entities with complementary information on their 
organizational integrity.  It included measures on organizational misbehavior, ethical climate, leadership, ethics 
policy, and fairness perceptions. To furnish the researchers with additional information on some 
methodological aspects of integrity measurement, the survey was tested and spread using a split ballot format. 
For an extensive overview of the split ballot design, see Wouters et al. (2009). In this experiment, questions 
concerning organizational misbehavior with response format ‘anchors’ (i.e. never 0-1-2-3-4 often) were 
compared with response format ‘labels’ (i.e. never - one time - several times - regularly - often). Wouters et al. 
(2009) concluded that the choice of the response format for these questions has an important impact on the 
results. In particular, they found a difference on the index of organizational misbehavior between respondents 
in both experimental conditions. The format ‘anchors’ questionnaire resulted in a higher mean and more 
dispersion compared to the ‘labels’ condition.  
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Using the same dataset as Wouters et al. (2009) and considering the differences between the split ballot 
conditions, we only included the respondents in the anchors condition because of the higher mean and 
dispersion. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the experiment conditions; the questionnaire that 
we used was sent to 3468 public servants, of which 1661 (47.9%) returned the survey. Due to item non-
response on one or more of the relevant items, the effective sample size for analysis was 894 respondents, 
which amounts to a response rate of 25.8%. 
 
Measures 
Organizational justice or fairness was measured using the scale adopted from Treviño and Weaver (2001). It 
consists of nine items covering perceived general justice (2 items), distributive justice (5 items) and interactional 
justice (2 items)2. Table 1 gives an overview of the items. The imbalance of items between the dimensions of 
the concept follows the original study by Treviño and Weaver. They created separate questions for fairness and 
ethical culture, but at the time of analysis, they discovered that some items originally meant for ethical culture 
were highly correlated with the fairness items. These items then became part of the distributive dimension 
(personal communication Treviño, 17 March 2009). The instrument also does not include a fourth dimension of 
fairness, namely procedural justice3. Because of limited space and the diversity of the companies in the study, 
Treviño and Weaver decided not to include this dimension (personal communication Treviño, 04 July 2007; 17 
March 2009). In order to retest their hypothesis, we adopted the original scale. 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
The items were translated and the original answering scale, a five-point scale anchored by ‘strongly disagree’ 
and ‘strongly agree’, was replaced by the scale that was used for most other questions in our survey: a six-
point scale anchored by ‘strongly disagree’ (score 1) and ‘strongly agree’ (score 6). A further adaptation was 
the replacement of the term ‘organization’ by the term ‘entity’, which is the current denomination for the 
organizations of the Flemish government. Despite the different theoretical dimensions of the concept, Treviño 
and Weaver (2001) report a one factor solution of the factor analysis, indicating the existence of a general 
fairness heuristic in the minds of the respondents. Our data confirmed the one factor solution, and resulted in a 
Chronbach alpha of 0.94 (table 1). 
 
 8 
Organizational misbehavior was measured with twenty-eight questions concerning observed behavior in the 
workplace of the respondent. The questions were drawn from the instrument ‘integriteitmeter’ of the Dutch 
bureau of integrity in Dutch municipalities (2007) and slightly adapted to fit the regional context. It is based on 
the ten theoretical types of organizational misbehavior distinguished by Huberts, Pijl and Steen (1999): private 
time misconduct, indecent treatment, waste and abuse of organizational resources, favoritism, misuse and 
manipulation of information, corruption, improper use of authorities, fraud and theft of resources, conflict of 
interest through gifts, and conflict of interest through activities outside the job. Given the overall length of the 
survey, twenty-eight items were selected out of the more than sixty available, taking the representation of each 
theoretical type into account. In addition, types of misbehavior only supervisors can commit were omitted, as 
there would be an overlap between these observations (the dependent variable) and perceptions of fairness 
(the independent variable). The instrument measures both the frequency and acceptability of the described 
behaviors. Respondents were asked to indicate for each item: (1) ‘How often did this occurrence take place 
during the past year in the workplace?’ and (2) ‘Do you find this occurrence acceptable?’. Numerical five point 
scales were used, representing the choices ‘never-0-1-2-3-4-often’ and ‘never-0-1-2-3-4-always’ respectively. 
The use of the neutral term ‘occurrence’ and the fact that respondents were asked to indicate perceived 
occurrences involving anyone of the entity (as opposed to asking to report on personal misbehavior), were 
expected to reduce the possibility of social desirability bias.  
 
For statistical analysis, one of the assumptions of Ordinary Least Square estimates is that the errors are 
normally distributed. If this assumption is not met, a traditional multiple regression analysis will not be feasible. 
Since summing the frequency items leads to a skewed dependent variable, a dichotomization of those items 
was preferred (Osgood et al., 2002). Each question was recoded into 0 (original score 0) and 1 (original scores 
1 to 4) and then summed into an index going from 0 to 28. Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis indicated in Osgood et 
al. (2002), that this method was the most successful among several alternatives. A plot of the observed residual 
distribution against the expected distribution shows the normality assumption is met with the ‘dichotomized’ 
index. This results in a measure of the number of different observed organizational misbehavior types. However, 
the index has to be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, the summative approach does not take the 
seriousness of the types of misbehavior into account: for example, corruption has the same weight as gossiping. 
Second, not all types of organizational misbehavior are defined as misbehavior in all entities; this depends upon 
the ethics policy. 
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Finally, we included some control variables: gender, tenure, five items measuring ethics policy and ten items 
measuring leadership. The items for ethics policy came from two different sources: the ‘integriteitmeter’ (2007) 
and the scales ‘follow up on reports’ and ‘unethical conduct punished’ of Treviño (personal communication 
Treviño, 04 July 2007). The respondents had to evaluate the statements on a six-point scale again anchored 
by ‘strongly disagree’ (score 1) and ‘strongly agree’ (score 6). Leadership was measured with the translated 
version of the ‘Supervisory ethical leadership scale’ (Brown, Treviño and Harrison, 2005) used in the 
‘integriteitmeter’ (2007). The scale (alpha: 0.95) consists of 10 items covering items that refer to the concept 
“moral person” (e.g. my direct supervisor listens to what employees have to say), as well as to the concept 
“moral manager” (e.g. my direct supervisor defines success not just by results but also by the way in which they 
are obtained). Spearman correlations between all theoretical variables are shown in table 2. 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Analysis 
Due to the multistage sampling design (i.e. public servants within nineteen organizations), we first had to check 
for dependency in the data. More specifically, individuals working in the same entity can be expected to be 
more alike than respondents from a random sample. If this is the case, a multilevel model where the public 
servants are clustered within organizations is needed. With an anova test (p<0.001) in SPSS, significant 
differences on the index of organizational misbehavior were discovered between at least two entities, indicating 
that dependency in the data could be possible. To model this dependency and correct for the design effect, a 
multilevel model was fitted with organizational misbehavior and fairness, using MLwiN. However, there was no 
significant variance at level two (the organizations), which indicates a multilevel model was not necessary. We 
can assume that public servants in this respect do not differ more from colleagues of other entities than they 
differ from colleagues within the same organization. 
 
The theoretical model outlined above was then tested with a hierarchical multiple regression analysis in SPSS 
after controlling for multicollinearity. Finally, the most efficient model was obtained by excluding non-significant 
effects one by one.  
 
Results 
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Integrity at the workplace 
Appendix A shows a table with the observed prevalence of the twenty-eight types of organizational misbehavior. 
The most common types are minimal effort by employees (observed by 56.2% of the respondents), gossiping 
(53.9%), use of internet, e-mail or telephone above the permitted standard (53%), accepting small gifts from 
external parties (43.5%) and falsely reporting in sick (42.7%). Deliberately giving false information in reports 
and/or policy documents (10.2%), accepting bribes (money or favors) to do or neglect something while at work 
(9.5%), accepting gifts of more serious value from external parties (9.3%), sexual intimidation (9.3%) and selling 
confidential information to third parties (4.0%), on the other hand are less often observed. Perceived 
acceptability (expressed in the average score on the five point scale) is also displayed in the table (appendix 
A). Interestingly, all types of organizational misbehavior receive a low score on acceptability, except one that 
seems to be a bit less unacceptable than the others (i.e. receives a value higher then 1): accepting small gifts 
(1.16). A possible explanation might be that the code of conduct of the government does not strictly forbid the 
acceptance of gifts. 
 
The relationship between fairness and organizational misbehavior 
Table 3 shows the results of the multiple regression analysis. The first model only includes the demographic 
variables, while in the second model the theoretically relevant variables are added. The third model represents 
the most parsimonious model where the non-significant effects are excluded. The four remaining variables 
explain 16.1% of the variance in organizational misbehavior. Fairness has a moderate and negative effect on 
organizational misbehavior, indicating that, controlling for all other variables in the model, the more public 
servants perceive their organization to be fair, the less they observe different types of organizational 
misbehavior. This confirms the relationship found by Treviño & Weaver (2001). 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Although all policy items had a significant negative effect on organizational misbehavior in a bivariate regression 
model, only two of them hold in this multivariate model. Specifically, public servants who find that there is a 
good procedure in their entity for reporting integrity violations, and those who believe that unethical colleagues 
will be punished, observe significantly less misbehavior than public servants who do not find or believe this. 
Finally, there is a difference between men and women; men observe more types of misbehavior than women.  
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Discussion and conclusion 
Drawing on equity theory (Adams, 1965) and fairness heuristics theory (e.g. Lind, 2001), Treviño and Weaver 
(2001) hypothesized that fairness perceptions influence behavior. Specifically, they predicted that respondents 
who perceive their workplace as unfair are more likely to behave unethically. In their study on ethics/compliance 
management, Treviño and Weaver (2001) found indeed a strong negative effect of perceived general justice 
on observed misbehavior within four private companies. The aim of the current study was to explore the 
relevance of this hypothesis in the public sector organizations of the Flemish regional government and so add 
to our knowledge on its generalizability. After discussing some limitations, we elaborate on the results 
concerning the frequencies of organizational misbehavior, the acceptability of the different types and the 
relationship between fairness perceptions and misbehavior. 
 
Before the results and the implications of this study can be discussed, some limitations need to be considered. 
A first limitation is that the analysis occurred at the level of the individual, and, therefore, no statements can be 
made at the organizational level. It would be particularly interesting, in future research, to understand the 
association between general perceived fairness in an organization and the amount of misbehavior in that 
organization. Future research might examine this link at a higher level of analysis.  
 
Second, proxy-reporting was preferred to self-reporting in an attempt to reduce social desirability bias. 
Therefore, we can only speak about the prevalence of different types of organizational misbehavior as observed 
by the respondent, and not about more or less committed misbehavior. This, combined with the fact that vague 
quantifiers were used as anchors in the answering scale, limits the strength of our conclusions. Yet, this does 
not mean a priori that proxy-reporting itself leads to a misrepresentation of the level of misbehavior in an 
organization. Future research might investigate to what extent population estimates actually differ between self-
report and proxy-report. Moreover, it would be interesting to compare the survey measures with information 
about internal investigations for the same organizations4. Although we acknowledge that those official reports 
underestimate the amount of misbehavior in an organization, it might be possible that this underreporting in 
case of the self and proxy-reporting are of the same level. Huberts et al. (2006) discuss the possibilities and 
problems of those methods, and conclude that for an understanding of the complexities of integrity violations, 
triangulation is necessary. Nevertheless, for some type of conclusions, self-reporting will remain necessary. If 
one is interested – which is often the case for policy makers – in influencing individual behavior, research should 
obtain information about the individual correlates.  
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The study first examined the prevalence of organizational misbehavior. Analysis revealed that this was low to 
very low for all items. The types that were most prevalent were minimal effort by employees, gossiping, and 
use of internet, e-mail or telephone above the permitted standard. A number of types are reported to occur very 
rarely: accepting gifts of more serious value from external parties, sexual intimidation, and selling confidential 
information to third parties. However, these results must be interpreted with caution. First, this does not mean 
a priori that the most frequently observed behaviors are indeed the most frequently committed types of 
violations. For example, several public servants can refer to one and only one colleague, since we did not offer 
the respondents a unique referent colleague, nor asked for the respondent’s own misbehavior. Second, 
perceptions are central in our analysis; public servants may have false impressions about behavior of 
colleagues and might therefore over- or underreport integrity violations. For example, because of a lack of 
information, respondents may perceive irregularities, while in fact nothing is wrong. Alternatively, some types 
of behavior are invisible or hidden from witnesses and are therefore not reported. Third, low observed values 
offer no evidence of low frequencies in reality. Sometimes respondents are not aware of the problematic nature 
of the behavior. Possibly, some types of misbehavior are accepted – by the respondent or within the entire 
organization – and are therefore not defined nor reported as misbehavior. 
 
As for the acceptability of organizational misbehavior, the findings indicated that none of the surveyed types 
were perceived as highly acceptable. Only one item (accepting small gifts) had an average score higher than 
1, possibly because this is not forbidden in the regional government’s code of conduct. The results show that 
although some types of organizational misbehavior occur with some frequency, they are not generally accepted. 
Thus, public servants who engage in these ways know their behavior will be disapproved of. Yet, the current 
study cannot determine whether public servants who find a specific type of misbehavior acceptable, will also 
behave accordingly. This will only be possible by means of self-report data. Nonetheless, the present data are 
particularly useful for policy makers. Lasthuizen et al. (2002) propose a policy approach for integrity problems. 
Combining the observed frequency with the acceptability scores, four types of integrity problems are defined: 
urgent problems (perceived unacceptable, high frequency), recurring problems (perceived acceptable, high 
frequency), specific problems (perceived unacceptable, low frequency) and non-problems (perceived 
acceptable, low frequency). Each type of problem requires a specific policy intervention. Our respondents 
perceived all types of misbehavior as unacceptable; consequently, we are dealing with urgent problems (e.g. 
laziness) and specific problems (e.g. accepting bribes). Following this framework, the urgent problems require 
 13 
a preventive as well as repressive policy, including clear rules and reprimands, while the specific problems call 
for monitoring to avoid escalation (Lasthuizen et al., 2002) 
 
Finally, the relationship between perceived general justice and organizational misbehavior was examined with 
a multiple regression model. The negative impact of fairness on observed integrity violations, found by Treviño 
and Weaver (2001), was confirmed in the Flemish public sector with different types of organizational 
misbehavior. Moreover, the effect holds after controlling for policy and gender. Perceptions of a good ethics 
policy seem to have a negative effect on misbehavior as well. The confirmation of the theory in a different 
context is an important finding; it is a first step in testing the generalizability of justice effects across contexts. 
As Hofstede (1980) suggested, individuals from different cultures have internalized different norms and values. 
Since fairness perceptions are inherently related to individual norms and values, the generalization of the 
influence of fairness on behavior is not obvious. Greenberg (2001) and Leung (2005) both concluded that 
although the importance of fairness might be recognized by people all over the world, their conceptualizations 
differ. In this replication study however, the effect of fairness on misbehavior is observed in Flanders as it was 
in North-America. Moreover, the relationship did not only hold in a different national culture, the study was 
also a first confirmation of the relationship in the public sector. Although the public and the private sector may 
value different norms, the present study suggests that the effect of fairness on misbehavior holds in both 
sectors. This adds to the evidence that the link between perceived fairness and employee misbehavior might 
indeed be generalized across contexts. Of course, since only 19 out of the 70 entities cooperated, this is only 
a first step; future research should examine this link – and the differences between contexts – more 
extensively.  
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Table 1. Principal factor analysis for fairness 
Items Factor loadings 
General justice  
      In general, this entity treats its employees fairly .786 
      Generally employees think of this entity as fair .694 
Distributive justice  
      Rewards are allocated fairly in this entity .857 
      Employees of this entity are rewarded fairly .865 
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      In this entity, people get the reward or punishment they deserve .853 
      Being consistently ethical helps an employee advance in this entity .696 
      People of integrity get the rewards in this entity .746 
Interactional justice  
      Supervisors in this entity treat employees with dignity and respect .813 
      Employees can count on being treated with courtesy and respect in this entity .800 
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Table 2. Spearman correlations theoretical variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Organizational Misbehavior 1       
2. Policy: Good procedure to report integrity 
violations 
-.292*** 1      
3. Policy : Clear communication how to behave -.262*** .589*** 1     
4. Policy: Integrity as part of evaluation conversation -.236*** .505*** .562*** 1    
5. Policy: Unethical conduct punished -.286*** .507*** .500*** .516*** 1   
6. Policy: Follow-up on reports  -.238*** .411*** .470*** .477*** .610*** 1  
7. Fairness -.337*** .450*** .423*** .453*** .482*** .555*** 1 
8. Leadership -.278*** .418*** .452*** .480*** .496*** .648*** .677*** 
***p ≤ .001. 
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Table 3. Results of the multiple regression analysis with organizational misbehavior 
as dependent variable 
Variable β model 1 β model 2 β model3 
Intercept 8.484 18.104 22.168 
Tenure    
     Started in or after 2000 (ref.)    
     Started between 1990 and 1999  .087*  .045  
     Started between 1980 and 1989 -.002 -.016  
     Started between 1970 and 1979 -.087* -.070*  
     Started in or before 1969  .019  .009  
Gender    
     Female (ref.)    
     Male  .101**  .104**  .103*** 
Fairness  -.185*** -.231*** 
Leadership  -.056  
Policy: Good procedure to report integrity violations  -.078* -.095** 
Policy : Clear communication how to behave  -.010  
Policy: Integrity as part of evaluation conversation   .024  
Policy: Unethical conduct punished  -.125** -.150*** 
Policy: Follow-up on reports   -.029  
R² 0.27%  16.3% 16.1% 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
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Appendix A 
 
Observed prevalence and acceptability of organizational misbehavior 5 
 Prevalence Acceptability 
Organizational misbehavior types Score 1 on dichotomized item 
(%) 
Average score on 6 point 
scale (1-6) 
Private time misconduct   
     Setting a bad example in private time 19.4 .44 
Indecent treatment   
     Gossiping 53.9 .30 
     Bullying (e.g., teasing, ignoring, or isolating) 33.1 .11 
     Not reporting illegal behavior 18.3 .22 
     Discrimination of colleagues based on sex, race or sexual orientation  14.6 .10 
     Sexual intimidation 9.3 .05 
Waste and abuse of organizational resources   
     Minimal effort by employees (laziness) 56.2 .34 
     Falsely reporting in sick 42.7 .25 
     Neglecting core tasks or responsibilities in order to engage in more pleasant business 34.7 .30 
     Careless use of organizational properties 33.1 .24 
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     Excessive use of alcohol while on duty 27.0 .36 
Favoritism   
     Favoring of friends or family outside the organization 20.2 .25 
Misuse and manipulation of information   
     Careless handling of confidential information 29.8 .17 
     Unauthorized use of a colleague’s password or access code 10.7 .12 
Corruption   
     Disclosing confidential information to external parties 29.6 .47 
  Accepting bribes (money or favors) to do or neglect something while at work 9.5 .24 
     Selling confidential information to third parties  4.0 .07 
Improper use of authority   
     Deliberately delaying decision-making processes 18.7 .22 
     Concealing information from the supervisory authorities 22.2 .29 
     Deliberately giving false information in reports and/or policy documents 10.2 .10 
Fraud and theft of resources   
     Use of internet, e-mail, or telephone above the permitted standard 53.0 .91 
     Use of organizational resources for private purposes 39.3 .59 
     Incorrect handling of expense claims 18.7 .14 
     Theft of organizational properties 21.4 .09 
Conflict of interest through gifts   
 22 
     Accepting small gifts from external parties 43.5 1.16 
     Accepting gifts of more serious value from external parties 9.3 .18 
Conflict of interests through sideline activities   
     Giving advice to externals in private time concerning professional expertise 15.1 .56 
     Outside activities or jobs that might pose a conflict of interest 14.2 .25 
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Notes 
 
 
 
1 The four private sector organizations were: a telecommunication company, a utility company, and two 
energy related companies. Each of these companies had a formal ethics program in place. The random 
samples drawn in the companies consisted of 2.500 out of ± 25.000 employees in one firm, and, 
respectively, 2.500/±12.000, 600/±6.000, 700/±1.500 in the other firms. The respondents were sent a 
paper copy of the survey. The overall response rate was 29%, with the four companies obtaining a 
response rate of respectively 31%, 31%, 29 %, and 28% (Treviño & Weaver, 2001).  
2 In the organisational justice literature distributive justice is defined as the justice of the outcome or 
reward and interactional justice as the justice of the treatment by superiors and colleagues (Colquitt et 
al., 2005). 
3 Procedural justice is defined as the justice of the procedures and rules (Colquitt et al., 2005). 
4 The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion. 
5 Items translated from Dutch without forward and backward translation for this article. 
                                                          
